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Abstract
Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke has described “compensatory mitigation” as “un-American”
and “extortion.” In keeping with that view, on July 26, 2018, the Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”) adopted a radical new policy that disclaims statutory authority to impose compensatory
mitigation measures.
Notwithstanding the aspersions the Secretary has cast, compensatory mitigation is a common-
sense policy instrument that has been a mainstay of environmental and public lands policy for
decades. It is a tool through which an agency authorizing private activities—drilling oil wells,
filling wetlands—conditions its approval upon the implementation of measures to offset attendant
environmental harms. Compensatory mitigation thereby permits economic activity to proceed
while maintaining the health of public lands and the environment more generally.
This Essay examines the sparse legal analysis included in the BLM’s new policy and contends
that it is illogical and unsupported by precedent. While policymakers may disagree about when
and to what extent compensatory mitigation is appropriate, the BLM has entirely failed to justify
its new and novel legal interpretation.
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ABSTRACT 
Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke has described “compensatory 
mitigation” as “un-American” and “extortion.” In keeping with that 
view, on July 26, 2018, the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”) 
adopted a radical new policy that disclaims statutory authority to 
impose compensatory mitigation measures. 
Notwithstanding the aspersions the Secretary has cast, 
compensatory mitigation is a common-sense policy instrument that has 
been a mainstay of environmental and public lands policy for decades. 
It is a tool through which an agency authorizing private activities—
drilling oil wells, filling wetlands—conditions its approval upon the 
implementation of measures to offset attendant environmental harms. 
Compensatory mitigation thereby permits economic activity to 
proceed while maintaining the health of public lands and the 
environment more generally. 
This Essay examines the sparse legal analysis included in the BLM’s 
new policy and contends that it is illogical and unsupported by 
precedent. While policymakers may disagree about when and to what 
extent compensatory mitigation is appropriate, the BLM has entirely 
failed to justify its new and novel legal interpretation. 
                                                                 
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law and Professor of 
Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I previously served as the Deputy 
Solicitor for Land Resources at the Department of the Interior where I assisted the 
Solicitor in preparing her opinion designated as M-37039 addressing the BLM’s 
authority to require compensatory mitigation. 
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  INTRODUCTION  
Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke has described compensatory 
mitigation as “un-American” and “extortion.”1 In his view, the Bureau 
of Land Management (“BLM”) is comparable to a criminal syndicate 
if it requires a company drilling for oil on public lands to offset some 
of the harm drilling causes. Following the Secretary’s lead, the BLM 
issued a new mitigation policy on July 26, 2018 (the “2018 Mitigation 
Policy”) disclaiming authority under the Federal Land Management 
and Policy Act (“FLPMA”)—the comprehensive charter for the 
management of public lands—2to require resource users to implement 
compensatory mitigation.3 This Essay contends that this new policy is 
based on flimsy legal support and flawed reasoning.4 
Here is a brief illustration of compensatory mitigation to orient the 
discussion to come. Imagine an area contains two resources: it 
provides elk habitat and beneath its surface lies natural gas. Drilling 
for gas will destroy habitat, at least temporarily; the same acre of 
public lands cannot be used for both resources at the same time. If a 
drilling company is required to take steps to offset the habitat it 
                                                                 
 1. See Jennifer Yachnin, Zinke vows to restore ‘breaches,’ keeps NPS despite 
reorg, E&E NEWS PM, Jan. 27, 2017, https://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/
1060056675/ [https://perma.cc/JZU6-8ZWP]. 
 2. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-87. Although there is no single definition of “public 
lands,” this Essay uses the phrase in the manner defined by FLPMA to mean 
federally owned interest in land managed by the BLM. See id. § 1702(e). 
 3. See BLM, Instruction Memorandum No. 2018-93, Compensatory Mitigation 
(July 24, 2018), available at https://www.blm.gov/policy/im-2018-093 [https://
perma.cc/AFT4-YSKK] [hereinafter “IM 2018-93”]. Those unfamiliar with the 
administrative processes of the Department of the Interior may be unfamiliar with 
“Instruction Memorandum,” typically referred to as IMs. BLM explains that IMs 
“are directives that supplement the BLM manual section and handbooks . . . [and] 
contain new policy or procedures that must reach BLM employees quickly, interpret 
existing policies or provide one-time instructions.” Instruction Memorandum, BLM 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2018) https://www.blm.gov/policy/instruction-memorandum 
[https://perma.cc/D6GJ-9XZF]. 
 4. As this Essay goes to print, Secretary Ryan Zinke has resigned from his post 
and his successor has not yet been named. The BLM has also released a slightly 
revised compensatory mitigation policy, although it has not changed in any relevant 
manner. BLM, Instruction Memorandum No. 2019-018, Compensatory Mitigation 
(Dec. 6, 2018), available at https://www.blm.gov/policy/im-2019-018 [https://
perma.cc/ZJ2S-VXWU]. 
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destroys to extract natural gas, perhaps by restoring degraded habitat 
nearby, that would be called “compensatory mitigation.” The BLM 
could (and for many years did) require compensatory mitigation 
through a variety of decisions: an applicable land use plan, a lease 
offer, or a permit to drill. The 2018 Mitigation Policy rejects 
compensatory mitigation across the board. Drilling may still proceed, 
but the BLM may no longer require the driller to ameliorate negative 
environmental consequences. 
The 2018 Mitigation Policy is bad policy.5  It views extraction of 
natural resources, such as mining for gold or drilling for oil, as the 
paramount use of public lands and it dismisses the possibility of 
requiring companies profiting from those uses to offset environmental 
harms. It replaces what the BLM has deemed a burden on business, 
with a burden on taxpayers, future generations, and the public lands 
themselves. Compensatory mitigation should be viewed instead as an 
essential tool to ensure that public lands serve the panoply of short-
term and long-term interests of the American people, who, after all, 
own the public lands.6 Compensatory mitigation is also vital to 
ensuring that sound economic principals guide natural resources 
development, because it causes resources users to internalize some of 
the environmental costs of their activities. Used appropriately, it also 
can promote certainty for the business community, by reducing public 
opposition to projects, the potential for litigation, and the likelihood 
that a court will intervene should litigation occur.7 The 2018 
Mitigation Policy will, on the other hand, lead to litigation both about 
the validity of the policy itself and whether in approving a project, the 
BLM should have imposed compensatory mitigation measures to 
offset environmental harm. 
                                                                 
 5. See Justin R. Pidot, Opinion Contribution: Interior Department will no 
longer require industry to offset damage to public lands, THE HILL, (July 26, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/399093-interior-department-will-
no-longer-require-industry-to-offset [https://perma.cc/7DXS-SBZP]. 
 6. As the Supreme Court explained in 1890 “[a]ll the public lands of the nation 
are held in trust for the people of the whole country.” United States v. Trinidad Coal 
Co., 137 U.S. 160, 170 (1890). 
 7. See, e.g., Justin R. Pidot, Public-Private Conservation Agreements and the 
Greater Sage-Grouse, 39 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 161, 186–88 (2018) (discussing 
increased certainty resources users can obtain where compensatory mitigation 
measures are implemented). 
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The primary purpose of this Essay, however, is not to join a debate 
over the best policy for managing public lands. Rather, this Essay 
challenges the new legal interpretation embedded in the 2018 
Mitigation Policy: that FLPMA “cannot reasonably be read to allow 
BLM to require mandatory compensatory mitigation for potential 
temporary or permanent impacts from activities authorized on public 
lands.”8 In other words, BLM has now determined that compensatory 
mitigation is not only inconsistent with the Trump Administration’s 
policy preferences, but it is also unlawful, a startling pronouncement 
given the BLM has long included compensatory mitigation 
requirements in a host of land use planning and management 
decisions.9 If the BLM’s new interpretation is correct, then FLPMA 
forecloses the use of compensatory mitigation as a tool in public lands 
management, and public lands will gradually degrade as 
environmental impacts occur without correlative efforts to offset them. 
To reveal unsound legal basis for the 2018 Mitigation Policy, Part I 
of this Essay provides a brief overview of FLPMA. Part II provides a 
full description of the policy itself and two documents it references in 
support of the legal interpretation it embraces. Part III seeks to divine 
legal principals from those documents, a challenging task given 
                                                                 
 8. See IM 2018-93, supra note 3. 
 9. See, e.g., BLM, NEVADA AND NORTHEASTER CALIFORNIA GREATER SAGE-
GROUSE APPROVED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN AMENDMENT 1–9 (Sept. 2015) 
(amending resource management plan to require compensatory mitigation for 
disturbance of greater sage grouse habitat); GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
IMPROVED COLLECTION AND USE OF DATA COULD ENHANCE BLM’S ABILITY TO 
ASSESS AND MITIGATE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS  15 (identifying a BLM office that 
requires compensatory mitigation to offset impacts associated with approving an 
exception to lease or permit stipulations). Requiring compensatory mitigation is not 
a new phenomenon. A policy issued by the Wyoming BLM office in 1995, cited in 
the 2018 Mitigation Policy, explained that at that time some believed “that BLM 
considers compensation mitigation as routine standard operating procedure.” BLM 
Wyoming, Instruction Memorandum No. WY-96-21 at 1 (Dec. 14, 1995) 
(hereinafter “IM WY-96-21”). The BLM website does not include a copy of IM WY-
96-21. A copy of it can be found in Justin R. Pidot, The Bureau of Land 
Management’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation Policy – Addendum, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3307224, and is also on file 
with author. While the Wyoming policy dictates that compensatory mitigation 
should not “be a routine operation of BLM in Wyoming,” it demonstrates that the 
Wyoming BLM relied upon compensatory mitigation prior to 1995 and it envisions 
continued use of the tool in “rare circumstances.” Id. at 3. 
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BLM’s paucity of explanation, and explains that each discernable 
principal is fatally flawed. Part IV discusses the procedural irregularity 
of embedding a radical reinterpretation of FLPMA in the 2018 
Mitigation Policy. 
A final caveat: This Essay focuses on the 2018 Mitigation Policy 
and argues that it fails to provide a plausible rationale for narrowly 
construing FLPMA to preclude all mandatory compensatory 
mitigation. It does not look beyond the Policy to discuss the 
affirmative case in favor of an alternate reading of FLPMA.10 Such an 
affirmative case, however, is unnecessary to understand that the BLM 
has provided no sound legal justification for its decision to disclaim 
authority to require resource users to offset the environmental harms 
they cause through compensatory mitigation measures. BLM has thus 
failed to meet the basic administrative law requirement that agencies 
show their work and provide reasoned explanation for their decisions. 
I. FLPMA AND PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT 
Congress enacted FLPMA in 1976 to govern the Department of the 
Interior’s management of public lands, defined to include “any land 
and interest in land owned by the United States . . . and administered 
by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land 
Management.”11 FLPMA includes both substantive principles to 
govern public land management and a procedural framework to 
implement those principles. 
Substantively, FLPMA directs the BLM to manage public lands for 
“multiple uses” encompassing a myriad of diverse uses of land—from 
resource extraction, to environmental protection—that “will best meet 
                                                                 
 10. In future work, I plan to demonstrate that multiple provisions of FLPMA vest 
the BLM with authority to require compensatory mitigation, including the 
requirement to manage under principles of multiple use and sustained yields, the 
obligation to engage in land use planning, and the prohibition on unnecessary and 
undue degradation of the land. 
 11. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1976). Many FLPMA provisions identify the Secretary 
of the Interior as the relevant decisionmaker, but as envisioned in FLPMA, see id. § 
1731(a), the Secretary has delegated that authority to the BLM. See Dep’t of the 
Interior, Departmental Manual, 235 DM 1.1(A) (hereinafter “DOI Manual”). To 
avoid confusion, this Essay describes FLPMA as directly vesting the BLM with 
authority. 
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the present and future needs of the American people.” 12 The BLM 
must also manage public lands for “sustained yields,” meaning that 
future generations will enjoy the same benefits from renewable 
resources enjoyed today.13 Finally, FLPMA requires the BLM to “take 
any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of 
the lands,” one of the few substantive provisions of FLPMA that 
applies to hard rock mining activities conducted under the 1872 
Mining Law. 14 FLPMA includes numerous other provisions, such as 
specific requirements for granting rights-of-way, but the multiple use 
and sustained yield mandate and the prohibition on unnecessary or 
undue degradation of the lands are two of the most important and 
broadly applicable. 
Procedurally, FLPMA creates a land use planning framework to 
govern management of public lands. It directs the BLM to inventory 
public lands and the varied resources they contain.15 The BLM must 
then develop and revise land use plans through procedures the agency 
develops, providing opportunities for public involvement.16 The BLM 
refers to its primary land use plans as Resource Management Plans 
(“RMPs”) and it sometimes develops subordinate plans for specific 
uses, such as travel management plans.17 Finally the BLM must 
manage public lands in conformity with applicable RMPs; any 
decision to authorize a non-conforming use must be accompanied by 
a RMP amendment.18 
II. THE 2018 MITIGATION POLICY AND THE DOCUMENTS IT 
INCORPORATES 
For an agency upending a long-standing interpretation of its 
governing statute, the 2018 Mitigation Policy is remarkably coy. 
                                                                 
 12. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). 
 13. Id. § 1702(h). 
 14. Id. § 1732 (b). 
 15. Id. § 1711(a). 
 16. Id. § 1712(a). 
 17. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(n) (1983); BLM, MANUAL, MS-1626, TRAVEL AND 
TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT 4–1 (2016). The BLM refers to subordinate plans 
like travel management plans as implementation decisions, id., a designation that has 
consequences for administrative appeals within the agency. See BLM, LAND USE 
PLANNING HANDBOOK, H-1601-1, App. E at 1 (2005). 
 18. 43 C.F.R. §§ 1610.6-3(a), 1610.5-5 (1983). 
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Statutory interpretation ordinarily involves a close reading of text, 
explication of statutory purpose, and a review of legislative history and 
subsequent implementation.19 The 2018 Mitigation Policy rests instead 
on what amounts to rumor and innuendo. The 2018 Mitigation Policy 
refers to “concerns” raised in a 1995 policy issued by the BLM’s 
Wyoming Office (“1995 Wyoming Policy”).20 That document also 
includes little legal analysis, and in turn references and attaches a draft 
legal opinion written by a regional solicitor in 1991 (“1991 Draft 
Regional Solicitor’s Opinion”).21 This draft opinion, the keystone of 
the BLM’s new legal interpretation of FLPMA, includes roughly one 
page (of its fifteen) addressing one specific compensatory mitigation 
program in one specific context.22 The sections that follow describe 
the contents of those three documents. 
A. 2018 Mitigation Policy 
As a set of instructions transmitted to BLM personnel, it makes some 
sense that the operative sections of the 2018 Mitigation Policy are 
directive, rather than analytic. Most are prohibitory: BLM will not 
require compensatory mitigation, will “not accept any monetary 
payment to mitigate the impacts of a proposed action,” and will not 
generally analyze compensatory mitigation as part of the 
environmental review process required by the National Environmental 
Policy Act (“NEPA”).23 There are limited exceptions. The policy does 
permit the BLM to allow project proponents to engage in voluntary 
compensatory mitigation, so long as such mitigation is “free of 
coercion or duress, including the agency’s withholding of 
                                                                 
 19. See, e.g., LARRY M. EIG. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS (2014). 
 20. IM 2018-093, supra note 3. 
 21. IM WY-96-21, supra note 4, at 2. 
 22. Draft Memorandum from Regional Solicitor, Rocky Mountain Region to the 
State Directors for BLM’s Colorado and Wyoming Offices, Conditions of Approval 
for Granting Applications for Permission to Drill 12–13 (1991) [hereinafter “1991 
Draft Regional’ Solicitor Opinion”]. Like the 1996 Wyoming IM, the BLM website 
does not include a copy of this draft memorandum. A copy of it can be found in 
Justin R. Pidot, The Bureau of Land Management’s Infirm Compensatory Mitigation 
Policy – Addendum, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3307224, 
and is also on file with author. 
 23. This section discusses IM 2018-93, supra note 3, which is un-paginated on 
the BLM’s website. 
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authorization for otherwise lawful activity, or the suggestion that a 
favorable outcome is contingent upon adopting a compensatory 
mitigation program,” and the BLM may incorporate voluntary 
compensatory mitigation in its NEPA analysis.24 
The policy defines compensatory mitigation as “[a] project 
proponent’s activities, monetary payments, or in-kind contributions to 
conduct offsite actions that are intended to offset adverse impacts of a 
proposed action onsite.”25 And it states that “[c]ompensatory 
mitigation cannot prevent what would otherwise constitute 
[unnecessary or undue degradation of the land].”26 
The final section of the 2018 Mitigation Policy, titled simply 
“background,” articulates a new, unequivocal interpretation of 
FLPMA: “While FLPMA in some instances may be interpreted to 
authorize various forms of the mitigation hierarchy, such as avoidance 
and minimization, it cannot reasonably be read to allow BLM to 
require mandatory compensatory mitigation for potential temporary or 
permanent impacts from activities authorized on public lands.”27 In 
other words, FLPMA does not authorize compensatory mitigation. 
To support that interpretation, the Policy offers a single sentence 
about the statute it interprets, stating “FLPMA does not explicitly 
mandate or authorize the BLM to require public lands users to 
implement compensatory mitigation as a condition of obtaining 
authorization for the use of the public lands.”28 Having disposed of 
textual analysis, the policy identifies a collection of other policies 
issued by President Trump and Secretary Zinke directing agencies to 
eliminate burdens to energy production. It then describes the 1995 
Wyoming Policy and 1991 Draft Regional Solicitor’s Opinion as 
“rais[ing] serious concerns” about compensatory mitigation. It also 
expresses the view that compensatory mitigation, “is particularly ripe 
for abuse” because it “does not directly avoid or minimize the potential 
impacts” of projects. This abuse apparently arises because “[a]t times, 
the nexus between a proposed land use and compensatory mitigation 
requirements is far from clear.”29 
                                                                 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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B. 1995 Wyoming Policy 
The BLM is subdivided into state offices that manage public lands 
in their respective states. Substantial authority has been delegated to 
these state offices, but they are subsidiary to the national BLM and its 
director. The 2018 Mitigation Policy relies on a policy issued by 
BLM’s Wyoming State office in 1995, which applied only to public 
lands within Wyoming and was set to expire by its own terms two 
years after it was issued.30 The 1995 Wyoming Policy  “conveys the 
position that compensation, as a form of off-site mitigation, is not to 
be a routine operation of BLM in Wyoming.”31 It raises a few concerns 
about the use of compensatory mitigation, although generally not 
about the BLM’s statutory authority to require it. For example, the 
policy worries that compensatory mitigation could create 
administrability problems because every resource user could be 
required to compensate for harms to every resource: “Conceivably, we 
could have a string of ‘compensations’ running parallel to, and outside 
of, the normal land use planning system.”32 The 1995 Wyoming Policy 
doesn’t consider whether compensatory mitigation requirements could 
be incorporated into the land use planning process itself, nor does it 
explain why use of compensatory mitigation in some circumstances 
would necessitate its use in all circumstances. 
The 1995 Wyoming Policy includes not independent legal analysis 
of FLPMA but quotes the 1991 Draft Regional Solicitor’s Opinion.33 
Generalizing from the specific context addressed in the draft opinion, 
the policy concludes that “[t]he Solicitor felt mandatory compensation 
was a form of ‘fund raising’ that was probably beyond the BLM’s legal 
authority.”34 
C. 1991 Draft Regional Solicitor’s Opinion 
Just as the BLM is comprised of state offices, the Solicitor’s Office, 
which is the legal office for the Department of the Interior and whose 
head is the Department’s third ranking political appointee, is 
subdivided into regional offices. The Solicitor issues legal opinions, 
                                                                 
 30. IM WY-96-21, supra note 4, at 1. 
 31. Id. at 3. 
 32. Id. at 2. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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referred to as M-Opinions, that bind all components of the Department 
and can be overridden only by the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, or a 
subsequent M-Opinion.35 Regional solicitors, who oversee regional 
offices, also issue opinions, but these are not binding in the manner of 
M-Opinions, but rather provide advice to field offices for the various 
components of the Department. 
The 1995 Wyoming Policy, and by extension the 2018 Mitigation 
Policy, rely on a draft opinion written by the Rocky Mountain 
Regional Solicitor in 1991. The 1991 Draft Regional Solicitor’s 
Opinion offers no general analysis of BLM’s authority to require 
compensatory mitigation.36 Instead, the draft addresses a specific and 
narrow context: BLM’s authority to impose new environmental 
protective conditions when granting applications for permission to 
drill to companies that already hold oil and gas leases.37 This context 
matters a great deal because, as a 2017 M-Opinion (which will be 
discussed in greater detail in Part V) explains “BLM’s authority [to 
require compensatory mitigation] may differ depending on whether it 
seeks to place conditions on . . . development during the leasing stage 
or condition applications for permits to drill on an existing lease.”38 In 
other words, the draft analyzed the BLM’s authority when it arguably 
is at its nadir, and offers no view related to compensatory mitigation 
requirements incorporated into other decisions. 
Even with respect to the decisions it addresses, the draft opinion 
indicates that the BLM has broad authority to impose new 
environmentally protective conditions—it focuses on seasonal 
operating restrictions to protect wildlife—on companies seeking 
permission to access resources they have already leased.39 So long as 
                                                                 
 35. DOI Manual, supra note 11, at 209 D.M. 3.2(A)(11). 
 36. The regional solicitor who circulated this draft opinion may be surprised 
indeed that it has been thrust into the spotlight to justify BLM’s new interpretation 
of FLPMA as disallowing all compensatory mitigation. The opinion was, after all, 
never finalized, addressed only a single factual context, and generally viewed 
FLPMA as granting the BLM broad authority to impose conditions even at the APD 
stage. 
 37. 1991 Draft Reg’l Solic.’s Op., supra note 22, at 1. 
 38. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Off. of the Solic., Withdrawal of M-37039, “The 
Bureau of Land Management’s Authority to Address Impacts of its Land Use 
Authorizations Through Mitigation,” M-Opinion 37046, at 2 (June 30, 2017) 
[hereinafter M-37046]. 
 39. 1991 Draft Reg’l Solic.’s Op., supra note 22, at 1–2. 
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such conditions do not prevent companies from reasonably accessing 
their leased resources, the BLM may impose conditions because: “it 
could not be more clear under pertinent statutory authority and case 
law that the Secretary acting through the BLM has all the authority 
necessary to protect wildlife on Federal oil and gas leases no matter 
how old those leases may be.”40 
Seasonal restrictions are not, of course, compensatory mitigation; 
the draft turns to that subject on page twelve. Specifically, the regional 
solicitor considers a specific compensatory mitigation mechanism 
under which the BLM would release companies from seasonal 
restrictions it otherwise would impose if the company payed money 
into a BLM habitat restoration fund. The draft expresses the view that 
“[t]his kind of ‘fundraising’ is probably beyond the BLM’s authority. 
First, it appears to be an unauthorized tax or an equally unauthorized 
attempt to augment BLM’s existing appropriations. Second, it strikes 
the subjects of the ‘contribution’ as little more than thinly disguised 
blackmail. Third, the courts tend to find such matters very offensive to 
fundamental notions of fairness and administrative law.” The draft 
opinion than discusses one case to support its view, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission.41 It the 
concludes that “if the fund would be used off [] lease or for a different 
species than those affected by the drilling, the proposed fund may well 
be inappropriate.”42 
III. THE (NON) LEGAL THEORY OF THE 2018 MITIGATION POLICY 
Divining a legal theory from the 2018 Mitigation Policy is difficult. 
It is a document of assertion, rather than analysis. It clothes a radical 
new interpretation of FLPMA as mere background information, and its 
clearest articulation of animating legal principals occurs in a quotation 
drawn from the 1994 Wyoming Policy that is itself quoting the 1991 
Draft Regional Solicitor’s Opinion. Charitably read, the document 
could invoke four lines of reasoning: (1) the courts could have rejected 
compensatory mitigation; compensatory mitigation could be either (2) 
government-sponsored blackmail or (3) unsanctioned fundraising; or 
(4) compensatory mitigation could be inconsistent with the BLM’s 
                                                                 
 40. Id. at 4. 
 41. Id. at 12 (discussing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)). 
 42. Id. at 13. 
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obligation to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the land. 
This Part explains why each of these lines of reasoning, even if they 
had been more fully elucidated in the 2018 Mitigation Policy, would 
be hopelessly flawed. 
A. Has Compensatory Mitigation Been Disavowed by the Courts? 
Let’s begin with the most legal sounding justification. Has the 
Supreme Court directly, or even implicitly, rejected compensatory 
mitigation? To the contrary. The decision cited in the 1991 Draft 
Regional Solicitor’s Opinion has virtually no direct application to 
public lands management, and to the extent that it does, it supports the 
use of compensatory mitigation to require resource users to offset their 
environmental impacts. 
The Nollan case represents the first in a line of cases in which the 
Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of land use agencies 
conditioning “the approval of a land-use permit on the owner’s 
relinquishment of a portion of his [private] property.”43 It, and the 
Court’s decision in Dolan v. City of Tigard,44 establish a test for such 
land-use “exactions” that is a common component of first year law 
school curricula there must be a “‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ 
between the government’s demand and the effects of the proposed land 
use,” or else the government has violated the protection that the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment affords to private property.45 
In the Supreme Court’s words, a demand for property lacking in nexus 
and proportionality “is not a valid regulation of land use but an out-
and-out plan of extortion.”46 
While some questions linger as to the precise bounds of the 
Nollan/Dolan test,47 one thing is an absolute certainty. The test is 
predicated on government regulation of the use of private property. It 
applies, at most, to compensatory mitigation by analogy. Public lands 
are public property, not private property. Most of the time users of 
                                                                 
 43. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 599 (2013). 
 44. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 45. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 599. 
 46. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838. 
 47. See Justin R. Pidot, Fees, Expenditures, and the Takings Clause, 41 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 131, 135–38 (2014). 
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public lands lack any property right to engage in a desired use.48 Nollan 
cannot, therefore, justify narrowly reading FLPMA to generally 
prohibit compensatory mitigation. 
Even by analogy Nollan validates, rather than undermines, 
appropriate compensatory mitigation. While some exactions exceed 
constitutional bounds, “[i]nsisting that landowners internalize the 
negative externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of responsible 
land-use policy.”49 That’s just what compensatory mitigation does. 
B. Does Compensatory Mitigation Amount to Blackmail? 
The notion that compensatory mitigation is “thinly disguised 
blackmail,” or extortion in Secretary Zinke’s words, also holds no 
water. Not every demand constitutes blackmail. Instead, blackmail 
entails “[t]he crime of making one or more threatening demands 
without justification.”50 
Compensatory mitigation is not “without justification.” By 
definition, it imposes an obligation on a resource user precisely 
because of the harm it causes. Through the use of compensatory 
mitigation, the BLM does not behave like a mobster demanding 
protection money, but rather like a store proprietor requiring a clumsy 
customer to proffer payment for a broken item. 
The Supreme Court has even questioned whether any demand made 
by the government for the benefit of the public can constitute extortion. 
In Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court rejected claims brought against BLM 
officials alleged to have engaged in a campaign of harassment to 
induce a property owner to give the government a right-of-way 
easement.51  The Court explained that while “public officials were not 
immune from charges of extortion at common law, . . . extortion 
focused on the harm of public corruption, by the sale of public favors 
                                                                 
 48. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 315b (“[T]he issuance of a [grazing] permit shall not 
create any right, title, interest, or estate in or to the lands . . . .”); Colvin Cattle Co., 
Inc. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 568, 570 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (“[A] grazing permit does 
not rise to the level of a protectable property interest . . . .”). There are exceptions in 
which the Nollan/Dolan test could apply to a compensatory mitigation requirement, 
for example, if related to a valid claim to hard rock minerals under the 1872 mining 
law. See Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 49. Koontz, 570 U.S. at 605. 
 50. Blackmail, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 2014). 
 51. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 551–54 (2007). 
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for private gain, not on the harm caused by overzealous efforts to 
obtain property on behalf of the Government.”52 Even if demands by 
the government for the benefit of the public sometimes could be 
extortionate, Wilkie strongly suggests that such circumstances are rare. 
To give the regional solicitor his due, his comment about blackmail, 
replicated in the 2018 Mitigation Policy, makes some intuitive (if not 
legal) sense in the context he addressed. Recall that his opinion 
discussed the BLM’s authority to attach environmentally protective 
conditions to permissions granted to companies to drill for oil 
resources for which they previously acquired leases through the 
Mineral Leasing Act’s oil and gas leasing process.53  In other words, 
the conditions the BLM sought to impose were not contained in the 
applicable resource management plan, in any stepped down planning 
document, or in the lease itself. While “a mineral lease does not give 
the lessee anything approaching the full ownership of a fee patentee, 
nor does it convey an unencumbered estate in the minerals,”54 the 
holder of a mineral lease has expectations about the development of 
their resources different than those who have not acquired (but hope 
to) a lease in the future. 
As resource users have more concrete, reasonable expectations to 
carry out proposed activities, equitable considerations suggest that 
appropriate compensatory mitigation should be more closely 
connected to the specific harm threatened. Compensatory mitigation 
can be implemented through other mechanisms, however, where a 
resource user lacks any specific legally cognizable expectation. A 
company acquiring an oil lease that includes a compensatory 
mitigation stipulation, or within an area governed by an RMP 
including compensatory mitigation requirements, has no equitable 
argument to make. They acquired the lease knowing full well what 
would be expected and whatever price they paid would presumably 
have reflected that obligation. 
In any event, equitable considerations do not relate to the BLM’s 
legal authority under FLPMA, but rather should be reflected in fine-
tuned, fact-specific policy judgments about when and to what extent 
                                                                 
 52. Id. at 564. 
 53. See 30 U.S.C. § 226(b) (requiring leasing for certain public oil and gas 
resources through competitive bidding process); 43 C.F.R. § 3120.5-1 (providing for 
an in-person or online auction). 
 54. Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 478 (1963). 
2018] BLM'S INFIRM COMPENSATORY MITIGATION POLICY 15 
 
compensatory mitigation should be required. This is the thrust of the 
1991 Draft Regional Solicitor’s Opinion. On the other hand, the 2016 
Mitigation Policy almost casually drops the word “blackmail” to 
justify a radical constriction of BLM’s authority, and in that context, 
the word amounts to mere propaganda, not colorable legal analysis. 
C. Can Compensatory Mitigation Be Viewed as Improper 
Fundraising or Taxation? 
Concerns about “improper fundraising,” “unauthorized tax[es],” or 
“attempt[s] to augment . . . appropriation” also don’t justify reading 
FLPMA to prohibit compensatory mitigation.55  For one thing, those 
phrases all suggest monetary payments to the government, and 
compensatory mitigation doesn’t necessarily require any money to 
change hands. Often, a resource user can offset its environment 
impacts through action, not payment. 
Moreover, there is nothing inherently untoward about using impact 
fees as a means to offset environmental harms. Returning to the 
Supreme Court’s exactions jurisprudence, the Court distinguishes 
between taxes and user fees, on the one hand, and requirements for 
funds to offset the negative externalities caused by land uses, on the 
other.56 The former are general fundraising tools, the latter are not. 
That appropriate compensatory mitigation can appropriately be 
implemented through impact fees does not mean that the BLM has a 
limitless ability to demand money from resource users. Labeling 
something compensatory mitigation, whether involving payments or 
otherwise, does not evade the administrative law prohibition on 
arbitrary and capricious decision-making.57 To make that concrete, 
consider a hypothetical version of the program addressed by the 
regional solicitor: Suppose that big horn sheep browse in the vicinity 
of a planned oil well during the summer months, and that restricting 
well operations to non-summer months will reduce impacts on the 
sheep. A compensatory mitigation program requiring drillers to fund 
restoration of habitat to serve as alternate summer forging grounds 
would seem a non-arbitrary means to offset the harm attendant to year-
round well operations. The BLM would face a more difficult time 
                                                                 
 55. IM 2018-93, supra note 3. 
 56. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 616 (2013). 
 57. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966). 
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justifying as compensatory mitigation a requirement that the driller 
fund activities across the country to benefit unrelated species. And it’s 
hard to imagine any court buying an argument in favor of a 
compensatory mitigation requirement directing the driller to refurbish 
the local BLM office. 
The BLM’s assertion that compensatory mitigation constitutes 
unauthorized fundraising, if true, would also have dramatic—and 
probably unconsidered—implications government wide. 
Compensatory mitigation is a central component of an array of 
environmental programs; the wetlands program of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, which relies heavily on credits derived from 
wetlands banks, is a leading example.58 If the BLM cannot require 
compensatory mitigation because it is an unauthorized tax or fee, can 
any agency? 
D. Is Compensatory Mitigation Unrelated to Unnecessary and Undue 
Degradation of Land? 
The final argument gestured at in the 2018 Mitigation Policy is 
significantly more limited than the others, but no more availing. The 
Policy asserts that “[c]ompensatory mitigation cannot prevent what 
would otherwise constitute [unnecessary and undue degradation of the 
land].”59 Even if true, this proposition would only bar compensatory 
mitigation in connection with rights to hard rock minerals under the 
1872 Mining Law, because those rights are exempted from many other 
provisions of FLPMA.60 In any event, the proposition is both 
unsupported by legal citation and logically unsound. 
In support of its view, the BLM offers an unremarkable truism that 
the obligation to prevent unnecessary and undue degradation implies 
that “a certain level of impairment may be necessary and due under a 
multiple use mandate.”61 True, but this is both insufficient and over 
broad. It is insufficient because the premise that some impairment can 
occur does not lead to the conclusion that impairment need never be 
compensated. Why is degradation that can easily be offset the type to 
                                                                 
 58. See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of 
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611–12 (2000). 
 59. IM 2018-93, supra note 3. 
 60. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1976). 
 61. IM 2018-93, supra note 3. 
2018] BLM'S INFIRM COMPENSATORY MITIGATION POLICY 17 
 
which FLPMA impliedly refers? It is over broad because the premise 
equally relates to mitigation other than compensatory mitigation. If 
FLPMA bars compensatory mitigation by dint of its allowance of some 
land degradation, why could the BLM even require resource users to 
take steps to avoid or reduce environmental impacts? 
A hypothetical example reveals that the BLM’s view not only fails 
as a matter of logic but leads to absurd results. Imagine an elk herd 
migrates from its summer to winter range through a narrow valley. A 
neighboring valley once served as an alternate migration route, but 
debris from wildfires blocked the valley’s spring, and without a water 
supply, the elk can no longer use the valley. A company holds leases 
to oil resources lying under the first valley and has sought 
authorization from the BLM to build a series of well pads. The well 
pads will make the valley unusable as a migration corridor. Without a 
migration route, the elk herd will die, disrupting the ecology of their 
summer and winter range, eliminating hunting and other recreational 
opportunities, and otherwise dramatically affecting both the health of 
the relevant public lands and a multitude of uses. Constructing the well 
pads, in other words, would seem to cause undue degradation of the 
land by resulting in the extermination of the resident elk. The oil 
company could, however, implement a compensatory mitigation 
measure to restore the spring in the second valley, making it once again 
useable by the elk and fully ameliorating effects to the elk herd. This 
hypothetical is, of course, a simplified version of use conflicts—here, 
use for wildlife habitat or for oil drilling—but it demonstrates that the 
benefits provided by compensatory mitigation can be integral to 
avoiding unnecessary and undue degradation of the land. 
A potential response to the hypothetical is this: restoring the second 
valley could be recast as a minimization measure, rather than a 
compensatory measure. After all, it reduces the harm imposed to the 
elk herd. But if accepted, this rejoinder scuttles the 2018 Mitigation 
Policy in its entirety. Any measure to compensate could be reframed 
as a measure to minimize: Requiring a company to compensate for 
destroying an acre of sage brush in one place by restoring sage brush 
elsewhere could be viewed as a measure to minimize harm to sage-
brush-dependent wildlife. Requiring a company to construct an acre of 
wetland for every acre filled could be viewed as a measure to minimize 
flood risk. The 2018 Mitigation Policy plainly does not envision such 
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semantic gamesmanship, adopting a broad definition of compensatory 
mitigation that includes any offsite obligation.62 
IV. THE IRREGULARITY OF THE 2018 MITIGATION POLICY 
The BLM’s reinterpretation of its legal authority is not only 
baseless, but also procedurally unusual. The Solicitor is the 
Department’s primary legal officer, and the Secretary has delegated to 
that office the authority to issue M-Opinions to provide “final legal 
interpretations . . . on all matters within the jurisdiction of the 
Department.”63 A new legal interpretation seismically reshaping a 
bureau’s legal authority would ordinarily be set forth in an M-Opinion. 
Indeed, the current Solicitor issued an M-Opinion inviting the BLM to 
seek guidance about its authority to require compensatory mitigation 
under FLPMA.64 Instead, the BLM issued the 2018 Mitigation Policy 
under the signature of the BLM’s Deputy Director for Policy and 
Programs.65 
The Solicitor’s invitation to BLM to seek guidance on compensatory 
mitigation arose from a shift in position that, at least by implication, 
undercuts the BLM’s legal interpretation. A 2016 M-Opinion 
designated as M-37039 concluding that FLPMA did broadly authorize 
compensatory mitigation.66 In 2017, after the administration changed, 
the Acting Solicitor issued a new M-Opinion designated as M-37046 
to withdraw M-37039, explaining that it “was primarily issued to assist 
BLM in implementing” policies that had been revoked and because it 
had “attempted to answer an abstract question – whether BLM 
                                                                 
 62. Id. 
 63. DOI Manual, supra note 11, at 209 D.M. 3.2(A)(11). 
 64. M-37046, supra note 38, at 2. 
 65. IM 2018-93, supra note 3. IM 2018-93 does indicate that it was reviewed by 
the Solicitor’s Office. Solicitor’s Office personnel routinely review policies and 
other decisions made by the BLM and other components of the Department to 
provide advice about potential legal risk, but such review does not constitute a “final 
legal interpretation” of the Solicitor. See DOI Manual, supra note 11, at 209 D.M. 
3.2(A)(11). 
 66. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Off. of the Solic., The Bureau of Land 
Management’s Authority to Address Impacts of its Land Use Authorizations 
Through Mitigation, M-Opinion 37039 at 3 (Dec. 21, 2016). 
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generally has authority to require mitigation when authorizing uses of 
the public lands.”67 
The second reason provided by M-37046 strongly suggests that, 
contrary to the BLM’s newly announced view, compensatory 
mitigation is authorized and appropriate in certain factual contexts. 
The opinion explains that the “BLM’s authority may differ depending 
on whether it seeks to place conditions on [oil and gas] development 
during the leasing stage or condition applications for permit to drill on 
an existing lease.”68 It also notes that “[s]hould the BLM have 
questions regarding the limits of its authority to condition the 
authorizations it administers, those questions should be evaluated in 
their specific factual and legal contexts with the appropriate assistance 
from the Solicitor’s Office.”69 
Why then did the BLM unilaterally reinterpret FLPMA without 
asking for new guidance from the Solicitor? One could infer that the 
Solicitor does not share the BLM’s crabbed view of FLPMA. 
CONCLUSION 
Compensatory mitigation provides the BLM with an important tool 
to address conflicts among potential uses of public lands. It is a tool 
that has been used for decades. The BLM can reasonably reach 
differing policy judgments about when, if, and to what extent, a land 
use plan, lease, permit, or other authorization should include a 
requirement that resource users compensate for the harms they cause. 
Its new policy, however, ignores all nuance, and advances a new, 
unsupported legal interpretation about the extent of the BLM’s 
statutory authority based upon what amounts to soundbites about 
extortion and unauthorized taxation. This glib disclaimer of authority 
smacks of a results-oriented give away to extractive industry, rather 
than a cogent exercise in statutory interpretation. Nonetheless, this 
Essay has attempted to take the BLM’s terse justifications seriously 
and invest them with detail far beyond that which the agency has 
proffered. They fare no better upon close inspection. The 2018 
Mitigation Policy is insufficient, unsound, and illogical. It should be 
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 68. Id. at 2. 
 69. Id. 
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withdrawn, and if the BLM persists on this course, a court should (and 
likely will) intervene. If that occurs, the BLM will likely fare poorly 
with the result that the reviewing court will relegate this ill-conceived 
and poorly reasoned policy to the dustbin of history. 
 
